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Human Security and the Challenge of  
Automobile and Road Traffic Safety: 
A Cultural Historical Perspective 
Achim Saupe  
Abstract: »Die UN-Agenda zur menschlichen Sicherheit und die Herausforde-
rungen der Verkehrssicherheit aus kulturhistorischer Perspektive«. The 
worldwide enhancement of road traffic safety is one aspect of the UN agenda 
on “human security”. The article examines the history of road traffic safety and 
the development of automobile safety technologies since the mid twentieth 
century with a strong focus on West Germany. From a historical perspective 
there are two reasons why the UN agenda includes the enhancement of road 
traffic safety. Firstly the development of road traffic safety is a “success story” 
in industrialized countries even though there are still high death rates globally. 
Secondly, the enhancement of road safety is linked to advanced civil societies 
with all their stakeholders, and strengthening civil society is a key concern of 
the UN worldwide.  
Beyond that, automobility is a symbol of modernity. Discourses about automo-
bile safety inform us about the conceptions and regulation of individual free-
dom and security in different societies. Moreover, new safety technologies 
such as the safety belt modify the interactions between human beings and ma-
chines and thus the idea of freedom, autonomy and responsibility. 
Keywords: automobility, road traffic safety; automobile safety; safety belt; 
individualization, autonomy; freedom. 
 
With the rise of the concept of human security, terms such as national security, 
internal and domestic security, social and economic security were fundamen-
tally expanded. This expansion of security as an important political term and 
concept integrates new societal values into the political discourse about secu-
rity.1 The human security agenda focuses on the global as well as the regional 
and integrates the protection of individuals, groups, and people. The UN pro-
gram strengthens individual rights, while the rights of groups, ethnicities or 
nations and in this respect the sovereignty of states have ostensibly taken a 
back seat. The report “Our Global Neighborhood” of the Commission on 
Global Governance claims the protection of individuals as its main concern, 
and therefore new threats such as crimes, social distress, diseases, poverty, 
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unemployment, migration, drug traffic, and arms trade have entered the politi-
cal agenda under one comprehensive heading.2 
The “Commission on Human Security” concluded in its final report that 
“human security means protecting vital freedoms” and offers two strategies: 
“protecting people from critical and pervasive threats and situations”, and 
“empowering” people’s “strengths and aspirations”.3 Critics have argued that 
this  
new conceptualization of security […] is so vague that it verges on meaning-
lessness – and consequently offers little practical guidance to academics who 
might be interested in applying the concept, or to policymakers who must pri-
oritize among competing policy goals.4 
The rise of the concept of human security is often interpreted in the context 
of the rise of the discourse about individual human rights, which refers to an 
individualization, privatization and juridification of social relations in the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century. The collective and individual rights to secu-
rity were mentioned by the Charta of the United Nations of 1948 and became 
vital in the OSCE process. In the 1980s they were discussed in Germany by 
various political theorists such as Gerhard Robbers und Josef Isensee who 
demanded a fundamental “right to security”, which was in a way related to the 
American concept of “freedom from fear”, first mentioned in Theodor Roose-
velt’s Four Freedoms speech in 1941.5 German critics swiftly responded, rais-
ing fears that such a fundamental right to security could include a considerable 
loss of freedom and constitutionality.6 
As Zygmunt Bauman has remarked, the German terms Sicherheit and its an-
tonym Unsicherheit in German are much more inclusive than “security” in 
English. Sicherheit manages to squeeze into a single term complex phenomena 
for which English has at least three terms: security, safety and certainty. Hence, 
the linguistic difference between safety from accidental events and security as a 
protection against intentional damages does not exist in the German language. 
Of course, in German there is “Sicherheit”, “Gewissheit” (certainty) and 
“Schutz” (protection), but the term “Sicherheit” integrates all of them. For 
Bauman, all these ingredients of “Sicherheit” are prerequisites of self-
confidence and self-reliance on which “the ability to think and act rationally 
depends”.7 With the overall inclusive concept of “human security”, the differ-
ences between “security” and “safety” seem to dissolve in the English-speaking 
world, too. 
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Empowering people to live a secure life implies, at first glance, the idea of 
strengthening individual and collective responsibilities while simultaneously 
restricting the sovereignty of the national states. The worldwide enhancement 
of road traffic safety is one component of the UN agenda on “human security”. 
In the following article, I will reflect on the concept of “human security” by 
using the example of the development of automobile and road traffic safety 
since the mid-twentieth century with a strong focus on Germany. The discourse 
about automobile and road traffic safety is also linked to the interaction of 
stakeholders in advanced civil societies and developing countries (and the 
development of a “world society”) and the interactions of human beings and 
safety technologies. Therefore, finally, I will discuss the conception of the 
individual contained in contemporary discourses about automobility and the 
enhancement of road traffic safety. 
Road Traffic Security as World Politics 
As mentioned above, the human security paradigm includes a lot of aspects of 
security and safety right up to engineering standards and road traffic safety.8 
The 1994 UN Human Development Report on “New Dimensions of Human 
Security” listed injuries from road accidents under the rubric “human distress 
in industrial countries”, and even mentioned road traffic noise as an indicator 
for (in)security: 
In industrial countries, traffic accidents are the leading cause of death for peo-
ple aged 15-30 – with some of the highest injury rates in Austria, Belgium, 
Canada and the United States. And in developing countries, traffic accidents 
account for at least 50% of total accidental deaths. The highway death toll in 
South Africa in 1993 was 10,000, three times the number of death from politi-
cal violence.9 
In 2004, the World Health Organization (WHO) focused on the theme of 
road safety in cooperation with the World Bank. In the same year the World 
Bank supported the Global Road Safety Forum (GRSF) in alliance with the 
foundation of the Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile (FIA) – an impor-
tant stakeholder of the automobile industry. In its 2004 report, WHO drew 
attention to the fact that road traffic collisions kill more than 1.2 million people 
a year around the world. As main traffic risks WHO mentioned speeding, alco-
hol, non-use of helmets, seat belts and other restraints, poor road design, poor 
enforcement of road safety regulations, unsafe vehicle design, and poor emer-
gency health services. Therefore, World Health Day 2004 tried to advocate a 
“systems approach” to road safety, which took into consideration the key as-
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pects of the system: the road user, the vehicle, and the infrastructure.10 This 
relates to a classical concept developed in the 1950s and 1960s, that road traffic 
accidents could be minimized by enforcement, education, and engineering.  
In general, since the 1960s and 1970s there has been a decrease in the num-
bers and rates of fatalities in “high-income” countries – a term defined by the 
World Bank.11 At the same time, there has been a pronounced rise in numbers 
and rates in many so-called “low-income” and “middle-income” countries.12 
The case of reunification in Germany provides a good illustration of how eco-
nomic factors can influence car crashes.13 After the reunification many people 
suddenly experienced a surge in affluence and access to previously unavailable 
cars and in the two following years, the number of cars that were bought and 
the total distance travelled by cars increased by over 40 percent. At the same 
time, there was a four-fold increase in death rates for car occupants, with an 
eleven-fold increase for those aged 18-20. The overall death rate in road 
crashes in this period nearly doubled, from 4 per 100,000 in 1989 to 8 per 
100,000 in 1999. On the basis of this experience, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Technische Zusammenarbeit (“German Society for Technical Cooperation”, 
GTZ) supported international cooperation among various stakeholders in road 
safety projects and initiatives and helped to shape national strategy develop-
ment processes from 2004.14 
The Myth of the Car and  
the German Discourse about Automobile Safety 
Cars are more than a means of transportation. In 1956, David Riesman and Eric 
Larrabee argued that the symbolic meanings of automobiles overwhelmed 
instrumental meanings.15 Roland Barthes compared the representative car with 
a Gothic Cathedral, and Henri Lefebvre saw the car as a “magical” object, “a 
denizen of the land of make-believe”.16 A few years later in 1974, while the 
design of cars had become less representative and more functional, Ron Hor-
varth claimed that “the automobile may prove to be the single most significant 
innovation in American culture during the twentieth century”. For Horvath, the 
automobile was “so shrouded in myth and has so much symbolic meaning that 
we could call it our ‘sacred cow’”.17 Automobiles and automobility are still a 
                                                             
10  WHO 2004. 
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symbol of mobility, prosperity, freedom, and stand for the possibilities of mod-
ernity and development. Besides the enormous death rates from car accidents, 
this is possibly an important factor in understanding why UN and WHO agen-
das focus their particular interest on road traffic and car accidents: They repre-
sent in a way the obvious risks of modernization.18 
In 2009, the German historian Eckart Conze characterized the history of the 
Federal Republic of Germany from 1949 to 2009 as a constant “search for 
security”.19 It has been argued that the 1950s and early 1960s were dominated 
by a discourse about national and social security, while the 1970s have been 
seen as the “decade of internal security” because of the political response to the 
terrorism of the Red Army Faction (RAF).20 In 1969 the German sociologist 
Franz Xaver Kaufmann described the rise of the semantics of security to a 
“normative concept”. Besides traditional fields of security policies – such as 
public security, national security, and social security (the latter was his main 
focus) – he emphasized the importance of technical safety. He differentiated 
between the safety of systems, operational reliability, and road traffic safety 
and built up many categories such as “instrumental safety”, “self-reflective 
safety”, and “autotelic safety”. For Kaufmann, technological safety and, in 
particular, road traffic safety and automobile safety was one of the most impor-
tant factors which strengthened the normativity of the security paradigm in 
everyday life.21 
Before the political concept of “internal security” was established in the 
domestic policies of the Federal Government in West Germany, the same term 
was used by car manufacturers and popularized by print media which com-
mented on new developments in the automobile industry. The development of 
“internal safety” features in the car industry was part of a “safety race” in the 
last few decades, in which regulatory administrations, car and insurance com-
panies, and road users were all involved.22 
                                                             
18  At the same time, the number of deaths in car accidents was always an argument used to put 
other societal risks into perspective: Thus the historian Keith R. Jackson observed that since 
1976, “more Americans have died on the road than in all the wars of the history of the 
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about 100 of whom died in pushing the Iraqi Army back to its own boundaries, were 
actually safer than if they had been at home, where a statistically larger number of them 
would have died accidental deaths, mostly in automobile crashes.”, in: Jackson 2006. And 
the expert for internet security Bruce Schneier, who was called a “security guru” by the 
press, relativized the risk of becoming a victim of a terrorist attack with the same argument. 
Schneier 2003, 28-30.  
19  Conze 2009. 
20  Braun 1978. Funk and Werkentin 1977.  
21  Kaufmann 1973, 49-90. 
22  MacGregor 2009. Several studies draw attention on the history of automobile safety tech-
nologies. Cf. Niemann 1999; Weishaupt 1999. From a more cultural-historical point of 
view, Norbert Stieniczka showed that after the Second World War the German discourse on 
automobile safety was structured by the dispositive of the “disciplined road user”. Later in 
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Since the 1950s, the number of car accidents increased in West Germany as 
in other industrialized countries, and safety experts had to develop new safety 
technologies and new societal strategies to prevent road traffic risks. This led to 
new definitions of automobile technical safety in the mid-1960s. Safety experts 
now focused not only on the causes of car accidents, but also on the conse-
quences of car accidents in order to reduce the effects of a crash. Therefore, 
German car manufacturers differentiated between “external security” and “in-
ternal security”. With the rise of the term “internal security” as a political key 
concept in the fight against crime and terrorism in the 1970s, car manufacturers 
ceased to use this concept. Automobile safety experts in Germany began to use 
the terms “primary” and “secondary”, and in particular “active” and “passive” 
safety as was customary in the English-speaking world.23  
In the course of mass motorization after World War II the death rates on 
West German streets increased nearly as much as the number of new registered 
vehicles. In 1951, when the Federal Motor Transport Authority was founded to 
manage the Central Vehicle Register, the Central Register of Traffic Offenders, 
and the Central Register of Driving Licences, Federal Minister for Transporta-
tion Hans-Christoph Seebohm (DP/CDU) remarked in a speech about the fight 
against road traffic offenders: “We have to be in a position to eliminate from 
our roads those vermin which hamper the flow of traffic and continually 
threaten to involve respectable drivers in accidents.” 24 This rhetoric to protect a 
Volksgemeinschaft (“people’s community”) of drivers went hand in hand with a 
strengthening of “individual responsibility and self-discipline”.25  
This stood in contrast to the liberal automobile and road traffic policy. In 
1952, all existing speed limits were abolished, even, and against all reason, in 
the inner cities. During the Wirtschaftswunder (“economic miracle”) the auto-
mobile was not only a symbol of new prosperity, but also of freedom which 
was understood in an anti-totalitarian way. On the one hand, these policies 
intended to emancipate the citizens from the paternalism of the traditional 
German authoritarian state, on the other hand there were new instruments for 
the control of road traffic such as the Traffic Registers. The abolition of all 
speed limits led to a rapid increase in the number of accidental deaths, and in 
1958 inner-city tempo limits were reintroduced.  
                                                                                                                                
the 1970s, the idea of the “representative sports car” was broadened and the automobile 
industry developed the “foolproof automobile”. This “foolproof automobile” reduced 
driving risks through the implementation of new safety technologies. See Stieniczka 2006, 
23. 
23  It is not very surprising that in the United States, car manufacturers did not use the term 
“internal security”, because it could have been connoted with the “Internal Security Act” of 
1950 and the persecution of Communists in American society.  
24  “Bundesverkehrwacht, ADAC und Sicherheit der Straße” 1951, 7. 
25  Klenke 1994, 158. 
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In the debates about the control of road traffic and the improvement of road 
traffic safety, the experience of National Socialism was an ambivalent discur-
sive point of reference. On the one hand, German highways were propagan-
dized by the Nazis as National Socialist modernization.26 On the other hand, 
National Socialist road traffic policies began in 1934 with the general abolition 
of speed limits, but they were reintroduced on the eve of World War II: in May 
1939 for motor trucks and then in October for all automobiles. In order to save 
resources needed for the war, high speed on German roads was now judged to 
be “unnationalsozialistisch”.  
From the 1950s onwards as a part of an “ideology of free automobility”, the 
tightening of road traffic regulations and the fight against road traffic offenders, 
road traffic controls and fixed speed limits were discredited with reference to 
“Gestapo methods”, “blind obedience” or “the steerable masses”.27 In 1960 this 
led the German sociologist Rudolf Gunzert to remark, during a hot debate 
about speed limits at Whitsun, that the West German citizens would “give up 
fundamental democratic rights without too much objection”, while a speed 
limit “would cause them to practically mount the barricades”.28  
Nevertheless, the concept of the “disciplined road traffic user” and the anti-
totalitarian ideology of the “freedom to drive” went hand in hand. Up to the 
1960s, many participants of the debate were convinced that automobile acci-
dents were caused by black sheep and were not a consequence of increasing 
automobility. The campaign “Free speed for free citizens” (Freie Fahrt für 
freie Bürger) was promoted by Germany’s largest automobile club (ADAC) in 
1974 in the aftermath of the oil crisis as a provocative answer to the speed 
limits on federal highways and traffic-free Sundays. This once more made 
visible that automobilism was linked with a liberal concept of freedom. In the 
end, the campaign of the German automobile club was successful and manda-
tory limits were lifted and replaced with an advisory limit of 130 kilometers per 
hour. While the discussion about a mandatory speed limit returned from time to 
time in the following years, even at the end of the 1970s the arguments against 
speed limits still drew on Nazism. As the news magazine Der Spiegel wrote, 
“with the end of the Nazi regime came the end of the period of speed limits on 
German highways”.29  
The Enhancement of “Passive Safety” 
In the meantime, the car industry enhanced the “internal” and, in particular, the 
“passive” safety of cars in response to growing public interest. The “passive 
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safety” included a safety cage with two crumple zones, at the front and back, 
patented by Daimler-Benz engineer Béla Barény in 1951, a padded dashboard, 
shock absorbing bumpers, burst-proof door locks, safety glass windscreens, 
snap-off mirrors, flush-mounted switches and mirrors, head restraints to pre-
vent whiplash, a collapsible steering column, side impact bars, and (in the early 
1980s) airbags. One of the most important new passive safety technologies was 
the invention of the safety belt. After 1955, Ford and Chrysler offered seat belts 
as optional extras, and from 1957 onwards, Porsche and Mercedes-Benz equip-
ped some of their production series with lap belts. In the same year, Swedish 
engineer Nils Bohlin invented the three-point safety belt, and from 1959 in cars 
the three-point safety belt became standard equipment in Volvos. In 1961, 70 
percent of newly registered cars in Sweden were fitted with front seat belts.  
In the United States, the insurance company Liberty Mutual Insurance fi-
nanced the construction of the “Liberty Safety Car” by the Aeronautical Labo-
ratory of Cornell University in 1955. One year later, Ford tried to sell its “Fair-
lane Sedan” on the basis of its new safety features and launched the first safety-
led automobile advertising campaign with the slogan: “You’ll be safer in a ’56 
Ford!” In Ford showrooms, photographs were presented that claimed to show 
that passengers in a new Ford were more likely to survive an accident than 
those who travelled in a Chevrolet.30 The campaign, which presented photo-
graphs of car accidents to potential car buyers, failed. 
Between 1961 and 1966 the number of annual traffic deaths jumped from 
38,000 to 53,000 in the United States, a 38 percent increase. In 1965, Ralph 
Nader’s book “Unsafe at any speed”31 and the consumer movement surround-
ing it – such as the “Center for Auto Safety” (1970) and “Public Citizen” 
(1971) – brought public criticism to bear on General Motors and other manu-
facturers, forcing them to pay more attention to traffic safety. Discussing safety 
was a long-held taboo in car industry, and Stan Luger has argued that this re-
mained so until the 1990s.32 Lee Iacocca, a top manager of Ford in the 1960s, 
was cited in the publication “Safety Last: An Indictment of the Auto Industry”: 
“Styling cars sells cars but safety does not.”33 
In the same year that Ralph Nader’s publication appeared, the General Ser-
vice Administration (GSA) established safety standards for government-
purchased cars following a five-year-long debate about this topic and after 
some federal states had launched initiatives to enhance automobile safety.34 
The National Highway Safety Act and the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle 
                                                             
30  Stevenson 2008, 193-196. 
31  Nader 1965. 
32  Luger 2000. 
33  O’Connell and Myers 1966. At the beginning of the 1970s this was still an argument of 
German car manufacturers; see for this the interview with VW manager K. Lotz: 
“Sicherheit verkauft sich schlecht,” Der Spiegel 43/1970, 252. 
34  Luger 2000, 66-68. 
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Safety Act established the role of federal government in auto safety and 
“brought to an end the auto industry’s long-held political hegemony” in the 
United States.35 New regulations were controlled by the Department of Trans-
portation, which was set up in 1966 to ensure “a fast, safe, efficient, accessible 
and convenient transportation system that meets our vital national interests and 
enhances the quality of life of the American people, today and into the fu-
ture”.36  
The American automobile industry was well prepared for these government 
measures, which can hardly be described as far-reaching. Seat belts were stan-
dard equipment in all Buicks from 1964, and an advertisement in 1966 told 
consumers: “Use them.” Other advertisements followed this new strategy of 
mentioning new passive security items which were built into the cars of the 
1960s. Ford offered in its 1966 Thunderbird an “overhead safety convenience 
panel” of control switches and warning lights, into which a seat belt warning 
light was built. This had aeronautical connotations and anticipated a techno-
logical development in which cars would “communicate” with the driver to 
uphold safety. 
From the 1960s onwards, debates about automobile safety in the United 
States have been conducted along an ideological divide. One side has argued 
that individual drivers must take precautions to ensure their own safety. This 
was the widespread opinion of the powerful economic lobby of the automobile 
industry which insisted that automobile safety could not significantly rise un-
less motorists actively cooperated. Those on the other side of the argument – 
safety activists, insurance companies and government officials – maintained 
that the public would never behave properly and that therefore “technical fixes 
must be developed and mandated to decrease the risk of driving” while auto 
makers should accept their responsibilities.37 Throughout the 1970s seat belt 
use in the US remained between 3 percent and 10 percent and increased when, 
beginning with New York in 1984, federal states adopted mandatory seat belt 
laws. By 1994, seat belt usage had increased to 73 percent, but even in 2008 
seat belt usage in the United States had still not topped 75 percent.38 
These new American safety standards had an impact upon export nations 
such as the Federal Republic of Germany and its car industry, bringing with 
them an “Americanization” of German business policies.39 As in the United 
States, West Germany’s critical press argued that the automobile industry was 
avoiding the installation of relatively expensive new safety technologies. In 
                                                             
35  Luger 2000, 74. 
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37  Wetmore 2009, 111. Also: Irwin 1985, 227. 
38  Wetmore, “Implementing Restraint”, 117. 
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1970, there was a turning point in West Germany. Official statistics counted 
1.4 million traffic accidents and 500,000 injuries, while 21,332 persons died in 
road traffic accidents.40 Since then, the absolute numbers of traffic accidents 
dropped owing to the introduction of speed limits on ordinary highways in 
1972 and a year later on federal highways in response to the oil crisis, the es-
tablishment of alcohol limits in July 1973, and the compulsory wearing of 
helmets for motorcyclists in 1980. This was coupled with a lower rate of newly 
registered cars, the extension of highways, and last but not least new safety 
standards.41  
In 1971, the news magazine Der Spiegel demanded “days without dead peo-
ple”, the introduction of a “safe vehicle” in which individuals could “survive 
the crash”.42 Three years later Der Spiegel wrote about the “motorized world 
war on the streets” and demanded the installation of airbags in cars, which the 
car industry appeared to be resisting.43 At the beginning of 1976 the West Ger-
man government implemented a law for mandatory seat belt use, although 
those breaking this law were not subject to prosecution at first. The mandatory 
seat belt use led to a heated debate among safety engineers, health and legal 
professionals, politicians, journalists, and drivers who were both for and 
against the seat belt and disagreed whether the seat belt was a “life-saver” or a 
“shackle”.44 The legal obligation to wear a seat belt was commented by Der 
Spiegel in 1976 with a front page headline “Bound to the car”. This was a reac-
tion to widespread fears about not being able to free oneself in the case of an 
accident. A year earlier, the same news magazine posed the question whether 
“the liberal state should be allowed to coerce the car-citizen into surviving”45 – 
which might have awakened associations with the contemporaneous debate 
about the forced feeding of RAF terrorists on hunger strike. In the course of the 
debate critics denounced the mandatory seat belt use as “state-decreed sui-
cide”.46  
The Federal Government reacted to these reservations against seat belt use 
with a nationwide campaign “click: first belt up, then drive”, which promoted 
seat belt use with numerous ads in magazines and posters on German high-
                                                             
40  The relative numbers in relation to newly registered cars and individual distance had 
dropped since the invention of the automobile. König 2010, 218. 
41  In the years after 1970 the number of traffic deaths dropped more or less continuously (as 
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deaths were counted in 2.2 million road traffic accidents, the lowest rate since 1950. 
42  “Sicherheitsautos: Für Tage ohne Tote,” Der Spiegel 34/1971, 86-104. 
43  See also the publication of the German theologian Klaus-Peter Jörns from 1992: “Krieg auf 
unseren Straßen. Die Menschenopfer der automobilen Gesellschaft” (“War on Our Streets. 
Human Sacrifices of the automobile society”). 
44  Beckmann 2004. 
45  “Sicherheitsgurte. Furcht vor der Fessel,” Der Spiegel 50/1975, 40-52, 40. 
46  “Das ist eine Art Todesurteil. Spiegel-Interview mit dem Stuttgarter Verkehrsrichter Hans 
Kindermann über die Anschnallpflicht,” Der Spiegel 35/1982, 100-101. 
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ways. But it took until 1984, when fining for non-seat belt users was adopted, 
for seat belt use to increase from 60 to 90 percent. Nevertheless, the introduc-
tion of fines did not stop an obstinate judge from acquitting a “belt grouch” 
(“Gurtmuffel”) with the comment that the freedom not to use the seat belt 
distinguished a citizen from a subject.47 
Road Traffic Safety as Mass Education 
and the Changes to Car Safety in Commercials 
Since the early years of automobility, measures to improve road traffic safety 
went hand in hand with road traffic education. Since the 1960s, television pro-
grams about road traffic safety became commonplace. In Germany, between 
1966 and 2005 public television aired the weekly program Der siebte Sinn 
(“The Seventh Sense”) which confronted the viewing public with road traffic 
dangers and gave advice about how to reduce the risks of automobility. British 
television broadcast public information films from 1971 onwards that promoted 
the use of seat belts with the catchphrase “Clunk, click, every trip!” presented 
by the media personality Jimmy Savile. In the United States organizations such 
as “Traffic Safety Now”, an organization of some thirty safety organizations, 
lobbied state governments from the 1980s for mandatory seat belt use laws and 
promoted seat belt use in brochures, in elementary schools, in educational 
programs with police officers, and public service announcements. In 1985, the 
US Department of Transportation, the National Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
ministration and the Ad Council created a television commercial with Vince 
and Larry, known as “The Crash Test Dummies”, who demonstrated what 
could happen when a person did not wear a seat belt. Unlike humans who die 
or become crippled in real crashes, Vince and Larry dusted themselves off after 
each crash and lived to joke another day. In 1999, Vince and Larry were retired 
along with their campaign slogan “you could learn a lot from a dummy” when 
the Department of Transportation revised the campaign and a new slogan sim-
ply advised “Buckle Up. Always.” 
Technically, the improvement of automobile safety was also a result of the 
scientific simulation of accidents. In the 1960s the automobile industry began 
to use crash tests to do research on the consequences of automobile accidents 
for vehicle occupants using crash test dummies developed in the military air-
craft industry. With the technical perfection of crash test dummies in the 1980s, 
safety engineers abandoned the use of dead bodies to develop new automobile 
safety measures. Crash tests and their illustrations in magazine articles and TV 
reports mass-produced accidents, making them appear less like chance events.48 
                                                             
47  Sternsdorff 1985. 
48  Cf. Virilio 2009, 7-8. 
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The accident was no longer something improbable since the accident had be-
come a statistical and recursive quantity.49 From the 1970s, the crash test re-
sults as well as their illustrations belonged to the common evaluation criteria of 
public car magazines like Auto, Motor und Sport and ADAC Motorwelt which 
were more and more concerned with the problem of automobile safety.  
Meanwhile, West German political parties promised comprehensive national 
and social security in their electoral campaigns in the 1950s. After the 1957 
elections, in which the Social Democratic Party used the slogan “security for 
all”, Mercedes-Benz promoted its cars with the slogan “safety accompanies 
you”. The ad showed a Mercedes star, which led the way over a dark and wet 
gleaming cobbled street. The iconography of the advertisement created a film 
noir atmosphere as well as connoting the compass rose motif in the NATO 
flag.50 While the brand symbolized total safety and security in this advertise-
ment in 1965, at the time Ralph Nader formulated his vigorous critique of 
safety standards in the automobile industry, Mercedes-Benz’s commercial 
experts were forced to take a more differentiated approach:  
Often it is said: Don’t talk about security, it is a dangerous topic. Why? Be-
cause there is no such thing as absolute safety? Because even the safest car is 
driven by humans who have different temperaments and react differently? No, 
this is not a reason for us to avoid the topic. On the contrary, you have the 
right to know how safe an automobile can be and what the manufacturers of 
motor vehicles can contribute.51 
Twenty years later, such caution about the question of automobile safety no 
longer existed. By 1984 Volvo Germany was promoting its vehicles with the 
slogan “safety at a speed of 200 kilometers per hour” and linked speed with 
safety. In a way, this was a prelude to Ulrich Beck’s study on the “risk society” 
and his theory of self-generated risks at the heart of a self-reflexive “second 
modernity”.52 This development towards a risk society allowed advertising 
campaigns to use pictures of simulated and controlled car crashes. 
In 1994 there was a campaign featuring a crashed Mercedes-Benz S-Class, 
renowned for its length. The ad asserted that the vehicle would also convince in 
the crashed “short version”. Advertising with crash test pictures was formerly 
unthinkable, but in the 1990s it reached the marketing strategists. In another 
more recent advertisement, car manufacturer Peugeot used the slogan “more 
fun with safety” just as Opel did for its “Astra”. In 2009 Fiat presented a crash 
test picture of a damaged Fiat 500 with a panda at the wheel, using the catch-
phrase: “engineered for a lower impact on the environment”. Here, safety and 
                                                             
49  Bickenbach 2009. 
50  NATO was founded two years before in 1955. 
51  “Mercedes Benz nimmt Stellung zu einer aktuellen Fragen der Autofahrer von heute”, 
1965, cited in Sproß 1999, 95. 
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environmental aspects were combined. And in 2008, an advertising agency 
headlined a co-campaign for Mercedes-Benz and the Dutch Cancer Society, 
which decided to no longer advise women to perform monthly breast self-
examinations with the words: “some tests you’re better off not doing your-
self”.53 
In recent decades, crash test pictures have formed our view of damages 
caused by road traffic accidents in a stereotypical manner, playing down the 
still existing risks of driving, reducing the image of a fatal accident to a harm-
less fender bender. Therefore, the risks of road traffic and automobility are 
nowadays not only a matter for state legislators, insurance companies and 
safety engineers; we are visually insured against accidents in the images that 
surround us.  
Morality in the Age of Safety Technologies 
The French philosopher of technology Bruno Latour has argued that artifacts – 
and in particular the safety belt – are bearers of morality as they constantly help 
people to make all kinds of moral decisions. In this understanding, safety tech-
niques are “techniques of morality”.54 In 1977, the Carter administration man-
dated that by 1983 every new car should have either airbags or automatic seat 
belts that closed over vehicle occupants when they closed the car door, despite 
strong lobbying from the auto industry. When driver-side airbags became man-
datory in all passenger vehicles in 1994, the automatic seat belt was abolished. 
Nowadays, many cars produce an irritating sound to remind the driver to use 
the safety belt.  
For Latour, such technical equipment embodies morality because the deci-
sion to wear a safety belt is not made exclusively by the driver, but also by the 
car. With the technology of the seat belt, the saying “never drive faster than 
your guardian angel can fly” no longer applies. As Latour puts it: 
The driver may become more careless, the car more intelligent. What one lo-
ses, the other gains. Each learns to live with the other: the belt needs a human 
being to put it in place and to take it off, the human being learns to live ‘on 
probation’ without making abrupt movements. Drivers no longer have to try to 
restrain themselves in case of sudden braking, the seat belt does it for them, 
but they retain the supreme freedom: to engage or disengage the guardian an-
gel.”55 
                                                             
53  Available online under <http://www.coloribus.com/adsarchive/prints/pink-ribbon-some 
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54  Latour 1996. Cited from the unpublished translation by Lydia Evans, “The moral dilemmas 
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In 1973 the novelist James Graham Ballard wrote his famous novel Crash, 
which was made into a movie directed by David Cronenberg. For Ballard the 
car driver lives within a “huge metallized dream” that includes “speed, drama 
and aggression, the worlds of advertising and consumer goods, engineering and 
mass manufacture, and the shared experience of moving together through an 
elaborately signaled landscape”.56 For Ballard, the century of the automobile 
created a culture of death, and the only way out for Ballard “would be to de-
humanize driving with electronically controlled cars and traffic flow”.57 
This vision would be the end of traditional “autonomy” in automobility, and 
in a way it has become true. In 1978, advanced braking system (ABS) was 
pioneered and the electronic stability control (ECS) was developed in the 1990s 
to “assist” the driver to keep the vehicle under control in critical maneuvering 
situations. With these new developments the driver’s domination over technol-
ogy was not called into question, with car sellers emphasizing not without 
reason that these technologies “assist” the driver rather than “governing” the 
driver. Intelligent navigation-based speed control amplified the tendency to 
delegate the control of the car to the technology and developments such as 
advance collision warning, automatic braking and lane departure warning sys-
tems that assist drivers to avoid accidents and are said to reduce injuries have 
actually come into use.58 A further technological innovation was the develop-
ment of driverless cars by the research project “Eureka-Prometheus” (Pro-
gramme for a European Traffic of Highest Efficiency and Unprecedented 
Safety), financed by the European Community in the years from 1987 to 1995. 
The pivotal idea of the research project was to reduce the human factor, such as 
“a limited field of vision, lack of experience, uncertainty, deficiencies, limited 
faculty in information processing and in the manner of reaction”.59 The elec-
tronically controlled vehicle “VaMP” achieved a distance of 158 kilometers 
without human intervention (on average, however, human intervention was 
required once every nine kilometers). 
In 2001, the German Federal Ministry of Transport proclaimed that “the fi-
nal decision and responsibility in the system human-machine-environment has 
to rest in the hands of the road traffic user” and that “external control which 
could not be influenced by the driver” were not desirable.60 A similar argument 
was formulated by a management board member for research and technology at 
Daimler-Benz, who remarked in 2002 that “cars nowadays integrate much 
computing power, whereas the pleasure of driving still remains – because that’s 
what customers want.” Additionally, he noted that nobody knows today 
                                                             
56  Cited by Wollen 2002, 16. 
57  Featherstone 2004, 16. 
58  See Insurance Institute for Highway Safety 2008.  
59  Cited in Stieniczka 2006, 337. 
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whether motorists in 50 years’ time will want to be driven by remote control – 
something that very few desire today.61  
However, new technological safety solutions delegate control tasks from the 
human being to the technology and, therefore, some critical commentators have 
argued that we have to conceptualize the driver as a “cyborg” or a “car-driver-
hybrid”: The interplay between car and actor is no longer “merely in the hands 
of the driver”, and new smart cars “eliminate any sort of independence that was 
assigned to earlier stages of automobility”.62 
Conclusion 
Up to the beginning of the 1970s the car industry and its managers often argued 
that “safety doesn’t sell”, not least because they wanted to avoid having to 
equip cars with relatively expensive new safety technologies. Increasingly, car 
safety was constructed as a positive quality in a similar way to motor perform-
ance and nowadays efficiency. New safety features were optional extras and 
regarded as attributes of social distinction – until they became, in part, standard 
equipment. In recent years, car safety has become a key concern of the car 
industry, and now “safety has to be there because cars don’t sell on price 
alone”, as the American economic journalist Joseph R. Perone wrote.63  
Today, security and safety are not only guaranteed by states and govern-
ments. While governments formerly legitimized themselves on the basis that 
they were there to establish “public tranquility, security and order” and subse-
quently national and social security, between the 1970s and the 1990s security 
and safety were discovered as commodities by the private sector. This “market-
orientated privatization of security”64 has led to a private service sector for 
security, in which the car industry is only one obvious example. In West Ger-
many the international trade fair “Safety 1974” for security technologies took 
place for the first time in 1974 and expanded in the following years.  
Contemporary history of automobility and road traffic safety reveals that 
there has been a change from a discourse about road traffic safety conducted in 
terms of security, freedom, mobility and autonomy (often understood as the 
naïve pleasure of driving and individual mobility) to a pragmatic discourse 
about the dynamic relations between safety and risks that are socially and tech-
nologically controlled. The implementation of new safety standards is addition-
ally part of a strong narrative about the rise of (global) civil society and the 
negotiation processes between its various stakeholders: consumer pressure 
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groups, the media, insurance companies, government officials, and lobbyists 
from the automobile industry.  
The implementation of the seat belt and the improvement of seat belt use il-
lustrate different attitudes to civil liberties, different concepts of social engi-
neering and different roads to a modern civil society. In the United States, 
national authorities passed controversial bills to strengthen the responsibility of 
the car industry and to enhance the implementation of technical safety while 
preventing laws for mandatory seat belt use for a long time. In West Germany, 
in the course of an “Americanization” of German business policies the compul-
sory installation of seat belts was out of question; authorities passed controver-
sial bills to force individuals to fasten their seat belts while preserving at the 
same time the “freedom of speed”. 
The development of passive safety technologies indicates that there has been 
a change in the conception of the relation between human beings and the tech-
nology. The development of the human-machine-system has shown that the 
control of technology by the individual has been replaced by the “assistance” of 
the individual driver by technology. Of course, the popular visions of a future 
in which humans are entirely governed and controlled by technology have not 
yet become true, but autonomy in the age of automobility has changed. The 
discourse about the “disciplined road traffic user” and the “responsible road 
traffic user” has come to an end. In addition to governmental sanctions such as 
driving bans and other punishments against road traffic offenders there are new 
technological possibilities controlling the drivers’ behavior nowadays, such as 
the development of smart cars or radar controls on public streets, which are 
indicated in advance.  
The UN program of “human security” is an expression of a shift in the se-
mantics and the political dimensions of security and safety and has itself 
changed because it strengthens at first glance the role of individuals, their 
rights and their responsibility in comparison to national governments and their 
mandate to protect social groups and the individual. Of course, the rather vague 
concept of “human security” includes the development of road traffic safety. 
Firstly, the death toll is still a problem in high-income countries and indeed a 
serious problem in developing countries and societies. Secondly, the experi-
ence in high-income countries with road traffic safety exemplifies the fact that 
risks of modernization can be reduced. Thirdly, the enhancement of road traffic 
safety is linked to the strengthening of civil society with all their stakeholders. 
Fourthly, and of interest for further study, the idea of the individual and there-
fore the idea of autonomy in the age of automobility and new passive safety 
technologies have changed considerably. Individuals are no longer in full con-
trol of themselves and therefore no longer subjects of discipline, and they are 
no longer understood as dominating over nature and technology. Individuals 
are instead an integral part of a complex social and technological “insurance 
culture” in which they are encouraged to take part. 
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